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We examine antitrust rules in a two county general equilibrium trade model,
contrasting national and multilateral (cooperative) determination of compe-
tition policy, exploring the properties of the policy equilibrium. It is not
imperfect competition, but variation in competitive stance between sectors
that matters for trading partners. Beggar-thy-neighbor competition policies
relate to countries’ comparative advantages, and hurt the factor intensively
used, or specific to, the imperfectly competitive sector. They also create a
competitive advantage for export firms. FDI can be pro-competitive in this
context, reducing the scope for beggar-thy-neighbor policies and reducing the
gains from a multilateral competition agreement.
Keywords: antitrust policy, competition policy, merger policy, trade and
imperfect competition, FDI
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∗This paper benefits from comments at a CEPR workshop on international competition
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1 Introduction
The prospect of a multilateral agreement on antitrust, with far reaching
consequences for national policy regimes, has sparked a nascent literature,
including Graham and Richardson (1997), Head and Ries (1997), Horn and
Levinsohn (2001), and Rysman (2001). While this literature addresses per-
tinent issues, it has a major weakness in that it builds on partial equilibrium
frameworks. It thus implicitly assumes that the industry under study is the
only industry with problems with competition, and furthermore, that this
sector is sufficiently small relative to the rest of the economy to leave all
factor prices unaffected any competition policy intervention. This literature
is consequently in effect concerned with the implications of discretionary pol-
icy interventions, rather than with the effects of competition rules that are
meant to be applied to a range of industries and circumstances.1
The reliance on a partial equilibrium framework may be appropriate when
the concern is with a regulatory problem in a particular sector. But when
the focus is on the establishment of a general competition policy stance, such
as when formulating merger guidelines, it is clearly much less adequate. In
particular, the exercise of international competition policy will typically af-
fect broad swathes of the economies of the countries involved and is thus
likely to have strong cross-sectoral ramifications. The purpose of this paper
is to examine some aspects of an international competition policy agreement
in a framework that takes account of such ramifications. This will allow us
1Exceptions are Auquier and Caves (1979) and Francois and Horn (1998). The general
equilibrium implications of monopoly were also recognized in the early antitrust litera-
ture. The rule of proportionality, proposed in the 1930s, targeted variations in markups
across sectors. (See Kahn (1935), Lerner (1934), and Robinson (1934).) In the modern
antitrust literature, however, this is little more than a footnote. There is also, of course, a
huge literature on the impact of market structures on trade policy in partial and general
equilibrium. Traditionally, the general equilibrium branch of the theory of trade under im-
perfect competition emphasizes monopolistic competition, while firm-level interactions are
modeled in partial equilibirum. (See Eaton and Grossman 1986 and the papers collected
in Grossman 1992). While the older literature on trade and oligopoly is mostly focused on
the partial equilibrium case (Markusen and Venables 1988) a recent set of papers by Neary
(2003) is focused on developing trade theory with oligopoly for the general equilibrium
case. While the body of work is substantial, policy space in this literature covers trade
policy, and not competition policy
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to relate strategic and distributional aspects of competition policy to ba-
sic trade theoretic concepts like comparative advantage and terms-of-trade
manipulation.
A general equilibrium approach (whether or not it addresses open economy
issues) generally offers a very different perspective on competition policy
compared to one based on the partial equilibrium assumptions. The conflict
is no longer between the “surpluses” of consumers and producers, or of differ-
ent producers, but between the real incomes of different factor owners. Even
under a consumer surplus standard, optimal policy may look very different
when taking into account general equilibrium ramifications of competition
policy. The general equilibrium approach also yields more interesting build-
ing blocks for examining political economy aspects of competition policy, by
providing richer modeling of the determinants of income distribution. A sec-
ond aim of this paper is therefore to remind industrial organization analysts
of the type of effects of competition policy that their traditional approach
misses. While the focus here is on an international competition policy issue,
several of the type of general equilibrium effects that the analysis highlights
are likely to be at play also in a closed economy context. It seems to us
that when addressing issues such as the appropriate general stance vis-a-vis
collusion or merger, as opposed to the appropriate intervention in the case
of an isolated case of collusion or a specific merger, a satisfactory analysis
must inevitably take such effects into account, or it may lead to erronous
conclusions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a two-country, two-
good model of trade with imperfect competition. Section 3 characterizes equi-
librium competition policies, highlighting how the incentives for a beggar-
thy-neighbor type antitrust regime are related to countries’ comparative ad-
vantages. In order to determine the distributional impact of competition, in
Section 3 we also adopt the two basic trade models for the determination of
income distributional effects of trade – the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-
S) model, and the Ricardo-Viner (R-V) model. In both frameworks, factors
relatively specific to competitive sectors may win from imperfect competition,
and hence may be a source of support in a political equilibrium with imper-
fect competition. Because the strategic competition policy drives a wedge
between the international price of the product and relevant marginal costs,
it also creates a competitive advantage (in terms of costs) for the imper-
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fectly competitive industry. This in turn has important implications for the
sustainability of strategic competition policy in a world with foreign direct
investment (FDI), an issue addressed in Section 4, which shows that FDI can
undermine the ability of an exporter to pursue a beggar-thy-neighbor com-
petition policy. In this way, the workings and incentives for any international
competition agreement are linked to the underlying FDI regime. Section 5
very briefly considers the impact of extra-territorial application of compe-
tition policy for the gains from an international agreement on competition
policy. Section 6 summarizes the findings.
2 The Model
Our focus is on structural, economy-wide aspects of competition policy,
rather than on discretionary intervention in particular markets. In order
to capture a government’s ability to affect the general degree of competi-
tion in the domestic economy, we assume that it can directly or indirectly
(without cost) influence markups over marginal cost. We embed this basic
feature within a two-country, two-sector general equilibrium model, where
costs are determined by a general equilibrium product transformation tech-
nology. The underlying production structure is general, and consistent with,
for instance, a standard H-O-S or R-V general equilibrium framework. Our
basic framework is summarized in the following list of assumptions (where
subscripts denote partial derivatives and superscripts denote countries):
• There are 2 countries, indexed by j = 1, 2.
• There are 2 industries, X and Y, each producing homogeneous prod-
ucts.
• Demands are identical and homothetic across countries.
• Factor markets are perfectly competitive.
• Both goods are produced under constant returns to scale.
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• There is a standard concave transformation technology betweenXj and
Y j:
Y j = T j(Xj), with T j
Xj
< 0, and T j
XjXj
< 0. (1)
• Product X is sold at a price which might exceed marginal cost, in an
internationally integrated market.2
• The governments control their respective domestic firms’ markup levels
in the X sector.
• Unless otherwise noted, product Y is sold in a perfectly competitive,
internationally integrated market.
For the moment, we also assume governments seek to maximize national
welfare, firms are purely national (they export without local presence), and
there is no extra-territorial application of national competition policy.3 These
last assumptions are relaxed in subsequent sections. Their implications are
that exporters are beyond the reach of the government in the importing
country, and that for each country we have
p = (1 +mj)cj (2)
where cj denotes the marginal cost faced by an oligopolist in country j as
defined by the underlying product transformation technology, p is the price of
2Identically, we could have assumed non-discriminatory ex-factory pricing. This is a
requirement of the GATT antidumping code, which treats international price discrimina-
tion as actionable and hence punishable by import duties that force equality of ex factory
prices. This implies uniform ex-factory pricing across markets, even with trading costs.
3The extent to which the welfare maximization assumption is descriptive of reality
can obviously be questioned. On the one hand, competition laws have a strong flavour
of consumer protection. However, domestic producer interests often make their voices
heard, in particular when foreign firms have been involved in alleged abuses of dominant
positions, or in concentrations. For instance, the tendency to allow and even support the
creation of “national champions” in many countries reveals the readiness of governments to
trade-off consumer welfare against producer interests. We view the assumption of welfare
maximization as a convenient middle ground between the two extremes of straightforward
consumer protection, and capture by producer interests. In any event, for the purpose of
this paper, other ways of weighing producer interests into country 1’s objective function
for competition policy would also suffice. Other possibilities are discussed briefly below in
Section 3. The two last assumptions above will be relaxed in Section 4.
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the product X, and (1+mj) is the domestic firms’ markup over marginal costs.
We can use any price as the numeraire, and find it convenient to normalize
the unit cost of production for Y to unity. Because it is the difference in
competition between sectors that matters (see Section 3), treating the Y
sector as a competitive benchmark does not compromise the main thrust of
our results.
We have outlined the model in a somewhat sparse manner, partly to pre-
serve tractability. However, the structure is actually richer than it may first
appear. Because we rely on a dual representation of the general equilibrium
structure of the economy, we can interpret our general results with respect
to a range of well-known trade models (Dixit and Norman (1980)). In addi-
tion, in the interest of relative generality, we have not explicitly modeled a
particular strategic equilibrium between firms. Again, this allows us to drop
down to more specific (competition) models when useful. For example, the
simplest way of thinking about the model is to assume that in each country
there is a single quantity-setting producer in the X sector. Unchecked these
firms would be in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. However, the respective gov-
ernment can force its producer to behave more or less competitively. Another
representation consistent with this approach involves a fixed number of firms
in each country that manage to collude perfectly with the aid or enforcement
of the respective government. The governments can then enforce a target
level of collusion within the industry concerned, such that markups are in
the range between the perfect competition and monopoly level of markup:
p =
(
1− λ
j

)−1
cj (3)
where j is the perceived demand elasticity for the sector,4 and 1 ≥ λj ≥ 0
is an index of the effective degree of competition.
4Equation (3) also follows if we assume that the government indirectly determines
markup rates through concentration policy as proxied by the number of firms in the
market, provided that there are no fixed costs involved. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium
value of λj will then equal θ
j
nj , where θ
j is the quantity-based market share of the country
j industry producing X, and nj the number of firms. Since market share will itself be
a function of the number of firms in equilibrium, λj can be set through an appropriate
industrial concentration policy. This approach has been used in several of the recent
partial equilibrium studies of international aspects of competition policy referred to in the
Introduction.
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Let us now characterize the general equilibrium of this economy. Since factor
markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive, the marginal cost in terms
of product Y faced by an oligopolist in the X -sector must equal the amount
of Y that is sacrificed for the marginal unit of product X :
cj = −T jx(xj) (4)
Hence, by equation (2) and equation (4), we have
p = −(1 +mj)T jx(xj) (5)
Let industry output of product X be xj in country j. Market clearing for
product X requires that world demand equals world supply, or formally that
S(p)[p(x1 + x2) + T 1(x1) + T 2(x2)] = p
[
x1 + x2
]
(6)
where S(p) is the budget share of product X in expenditures, and the brack-
eted term on the left-hand side is world income expressed in terms of product
Y. Expressions (4), (5), and (6) constitute a system of equations sufficient to
determine the unknowns p, cj, xj as functions of the two markupsmj. Hence-
forth P (m1,m2), Cj(m1,m2), and Xj(m1,m2) will refer to these equilibrium
solutions for p, c, and x. It is straightforward to show that in equilibrium,
Xj
mj
< 0, X imj > 0, Pmj > 0, i 6= j (7)
We next turn to the definition of comparative advantage. To this end, let
Dj(m1,m2) be the domestic consumption of product X in country j. We
will say that Country 1 has a comparative advantage in product X in the
sense that it is a net exporter of X in the case where there is global perfect
competition in this industry, i.e. X1(0, 0) > D1(0, 0) . Deviations from this
equilibrium pattern can then be attributed to differences in competition, or
identically to policy-induced competitive advantage. In order to simplify
the discussion, we will assume that trade patterns are not reversed for any
combination of markups:5
X1(m1,m2)−D1(m1,m2) > 0, ∀(m1,m2) (8)
5This will hold for the Nash equilibrium set of competition policies, see below. Outside
the Nash equilibrium set of competition policies, we can construct cases where the direction
of trade depends on markups/collusion. For example, with otherwise identical countries
(and hence no traditional basis for trade in endowment or technology models of trade),
differential markup policies will generate exports of X from the country with the lowest
markup levels.
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We can define national welfare on the basis of identical homothetic prefer-
ences as follows:
W j(m1,m2) ≡ 1
I(P )
[
(P − Cj)Xj + CjXj + T j(Xj)] (9)
where I(P ) is the equilibrium value of the utility price index (an ideal con-
sumer price index) for the representative consumer, defined over composite
consumption good Q. 6 The first term in this expression represents profit,
while the second and third terms represent factor incomes.
3 Antitrust in a Trade-Only Equilibrium
Taking the social welfare measure in expression (9) as the government objec-
tive function, we can now characterize the properties of the policy equilib-
rium, with emphasis on aggregate and distributional effects of the choice of
policies.
3.1 Aggregate Effects
The typical industrial organization analysis would view significant markups
in a particular industry as a clear indication that there is likely to be a
socially wasteful misallocation of resources in the industry. Once the analy-
sis is extended to a general equilibrium framework, the perspective changes
fundamentally, however. In particular, once the interplay between monopo-
listic practices in different sectors is taken into account, it is the difference
in competition between sectors that is critical. This finding is definitely not
new – it can be traced back to Kahn (1935), Lerner (1934) and Robinson
(1934) – but it seems to have gone unnoticed in the modern industrial or-
ganization literature. To demonstrate this feature, assume temporarily (and
6Given homothetic preferences, it follows directly from the the properties of the social
expenditure function E(P,W ) defined over welfare W and prices P . It allows us to deflate
nominal income values directly. The terms EP = Q and EW = I(P ) follow from the
definition of the national expenditure function, and its properties. For a more detailed
account of duality in trade theory, see the technical annex to Dixit and Norman (1980).
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contrary to what has been assumed above) that there is an economy-wide
markup rate m˜j, a situation we will refer to as Lerner proportionality. In
this economy, incomes for factor owners, as well as the aggregate profits, will
depend on the markup. In particular, the higher is the markup, the larger
is the share of GDP that accrues to profits. GDP itself will not be affected
by the level of the markups, however: By our numeraire definition, the cost
of producing Y remains unity, though the price of Y may change. We will
then have income (1+ m˜j) ·G(P 0, V j) where G is the GDP function defined
over the competitive equilibrium price vector P 0 and the endowment vector
V j. The indirect utility price index can then also be defined with respect to
the competitive equilibrium price vector P 0 and our (symmetric) markups:
I(P ) = (1 + m˜j) · I(P 0). The real income is then
W j(·) = G(P
0, V )
I(P 0)
(10)
which as can be seen is independent of the markup level. Hence:7
Proposition 1 With Lerner proportionality, the impact of imperfect com-
petition is to redistribute income from factor owners to recipients of profits.
Aggregate welfare is unaffected.
Note that Proposition 1 can be seen as providing some support for the use of
a consumer surplus standard in competition policy. If problems of imperfect
competition are pervasive in the economy, this may not be of primary concern
from an aggregate welfare point of view, but could still be very harmful
to consumers, by lowering their real incomes and hence having important
distributional effects.
For the rest of the paper we focus on situations where there are asymmetries
between sectors such that the markups differ. Consider the case where the
7It may help to imagine a process where the government imposes identical degrees
of competition, as measured by markups, through a policy of concentration. Individual
oligopolists then try to raise prices by reducing output. In an economy-wide setting, this
leads to falling factor prices. With falling marginal cost, oligopolists boost output, restor-
ing full employment at lower factor prices. In this sense, an economy-wide equivalence in
the degree of competition is like an economywide VAT or output tax.
8
Y sector is inherently competitive, but where markups can be encouraged
(through mergers or collusion) in the X sector. The impact on real national
income (deflated by the price of utility) of a marginal increase in the markup
rate m in sector X is
W j
mj
=
mjXj
mj
I(P )
+
Xj −Dj
I(P )
Pmj (11)
The first term in this expression is negative. It represents the loss of profits
on existing sales as we reduce output further to boost the markup rate itself.
The sign of the second term depends on whether the country is a net importer
or exporter of product X, and is positive if and only if the country exports
the product. It represents terms-of-trade gains made at the expense of the
net importer. The net exporter will have an incentive to cartelize the sector
since
W j
mj
(0, 0) =
Xj(0, 0)−Dj(0, 0)
I(P )
Pmj > 0 (12)
Hence, the net exporter of product X has an incentive to deviate from any
perfectly competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Absent an international antitrust agreement, national wel-
fare maximization implies that the X importer will enforce marginal cost pric-
ing among its X firms, and the X exporter will allow for positive markups by
its X firms.
By focusing on the Nash equilibrium competition policy and its relationship
to comparative advantage, Proposition 2 means that we avoid potential inde-
terminacy about the effects of foreign competition on domestic competition
policy in partial equilibrium.
Obviously, from a world point of view the Nash equilibrium is sub-optimal,
as can be seen from
d
dm1
[W 1(m1,m2) +W 2(m1,m2)] =
m1
I(P )
X1m1 +
m2
I(P )
X2m1
which is negative for m2 sufficiently small. Consequently:
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Proposition 3 An international agreement on antitrust policy could increase
world welfare. However, to improve welfare for both countries, side payments
are necessary.
Proposition 3 suggests two separate reasons why attempts are underway to
bring a competition policy agreement into the WTO, rather than let it stand
by itself. First, our Country 1 prefers the non-cooperative equilibrium to the
situation where marginal cost pricing is enforced globally. Hence, in order
for both parties to accept an agreement on competition policy it is necessary
that Country 1 receives some form of side payment. The wide-ranging struc-
ture of the WTO agreements is likely to offer ample opportunities for such
concessions. Note, however, that this is an argument for why the competi-
tion policy agreement may need the trade agreement to be politically viable,
rather than vice versa. The second reason follows from the next Proposition:
Proposition 4 An international antitrust agreement would increase trade.
The strategic competition policy induces both countries to shift production
toward their respective import sectors, and trade in both products is reduced
(albeit not eliminated). The reduction in trade follows directly from price
increases on the part of the Country 1 producers. At the same time, we
know that exports will not be eliminated. Even if it were possible to choose
m1 > 0 such that trade ceased to exist, it would not be optimal, since at
such a value of m1,
W 1m1 =
m1C1
I(P )
X1m1 < 0 (13)
In terms of trade volumes, a trade and a competition policy agreement would
thus be complementary. Therefore, considering the fact that the WTO is an
organization with a pronounced “more trade is always better” attitude, the
attempts to bring competition policy into the WTO are not surprising.
The equilibrium described by Propositions 2 - 4 can be summarized using
Figures 1 and 2. In the figures, the Country 1 and Country 2 transformation
frontiers as defined in equation (1) are mapped relative to origins O1 and
O2. World production will be defined by point a while consumption is at
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point b. Perfect competition in both countries is represented by a tangency
of the two production possibility frontiers. This is so because at point b
we have equality between the marginal rates of transformation, prices, and
marginal valuation in consumption. As prices and preferences are assumed
identical across countries, consumption is along the diagonal from O1 to O2.
International trade is then the re-allocation of quantities needed to let both
countries consume at point b, given the global production point a. As such,
the import quantities (the trade vector) are shown as m2x and m
1
y. The
efficiency frontier BB is derived by tracing point O1 as we move the Country
1 production frontier along the Country 2 production frontier, maintaining
tangency.
In contrast to the competitive equilibrium in Figure 1, with the strategic com-
petition policy equilibrium in Figure 2 production instead occurs at point a
with non-marginal cost pricing by one country and marginal-cost (i.e. com-
petitive) pricing by the other. Consumption takes place at a point b at goods
prices given by a slope for the line ab that is higher, for good X, relative to
the corresponding line in Figure 1. The positive markup in the home country
is reflected in the non-tangency of price with the Country 1 frontier. Propo-
sition 2 is reflected by the fact that point O1 is below the global efficiency
envelope without tangency.
3.2 Strategic Competition Policy and Competitive Ad-
vantage
We now turn to the policy interaction between the governments. To see the
incentive for country j to intervene, consider the impact of an increase in the
markup in its domestic sector on real factor incomes, as given by the last
terms of expression (9). In general we have equation (14).
d
dmj
[
CjXj + T j(Xj)
I(P )
]
= −C
jXj + T j(Xj)
I(P )2
IPPmj +
Cj
mj
I(P )
Xj
mj
< 0 (14)
On the right-hand side, the first term in brackets represents the relative price
effects (the price of X changes relative to that of Y ), while the second term
relates to the drop in factor income following from reduced factor demand
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(as firms try to constrain output). The second term flags a reduction in the
cost of producing X and implies a drop in aggregate factor incomes. We can
therefore also conclude the following:
Proposition 5 A strategic competition policy not only increases profits of
domestic firms by permitting larger markups, but also tends to enhance the
apparent competitive advantage of these firms by lowering their marginal
costs.
Note that Proposition 5 relates to a pure general equilibrium phenomenon.
When an exporting country is large enough to affect international prices, a
generally slack competition policy (or one that actively encourages exercise
of market power) in this country will lead to lowered demand for factors of
production, and this will in turn reduce their rewards.8
The strategic competition policy is similar in its effect to those of a strategic
trade policy in a Cournot setting, in that it lowers the marginal costs for
exporters and hence confers to them a cost advantage. However, in the case
of the strategic trade policy, the lower costs are meant to capture market
shares, whereas here with the strategic competition policy the exporting
country loses market share. It is more like an optimal trade policy in the
Bertrand case, which as shown by Eaton and Grossman (1986) often is a
tax, even though here the gain comes only through the reduced competition
between domestic firms. Hence, the competition policy here is not “strategic”
in the sense of altering the competitive position of domestic firms vis-a-vis
foreign competitors, but in the sense of affecting the competition between
domestic firms.
3.3 The Distributional Effects of Strategic Competi-
tion Policies
In standard industrial organization analysis, cartelization has positive exter-
nalities for outside firms in the industry. However, here the firms from the
8Though without formalization, Norman (1996) makes a similar observation.
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net importing country will not be able to profit from the cartelization, since
their government continues to enforce marginal cost pricing. Therefore, since
all income is factor income in this country, these factor owners as a group
lose from the other country’s competition policy. Hence, when we draw a
line between (collective) factor owners and firm owners in the two countries,
the only income group that gains in the aggregate from the cartelization is
the owners of firms in the X industry in Country 1.
But while factor owners as a group in each of the countries lose from carteliza-
tion, it is still possible that certain factor owners gain. In order to determine
possible winners and losers, and thus the likely sources of support for an inter-
national competition policy agreement, we must add further structure to the
production technologies. We consider two standard trade models commonly
employed to examine issues of income distribution.
First, assume that the underlying transformation technology in equation (1)
is the reduced form of a H-O-S economy. With positive markups in the
X sector, output in this sector is constrained relative to the other sector
(assuming full employment of both factors). It is this reduction in output,
and hence in input demands, that forces factor incomes down relative to final
goods prices, and makes profits possible. At the same time, the Y sector will
not employ factors in the same proportion in which they are released by
the X sector. Hence, from the well-known relationship between goods prices
and factor incomes in the Heckscher-Ohlin model (aka Stolper-Samuelson
theorem), the fall in the relative value of Cj (i.e. marginal cost) will also
involve a fall in income for the X intensive factor greater than the reduction in
Cj. Designating ΩX,1 as the equilibrium income of the factor used intensively
in X production in Country 1:
Pm1 > 0 > C
1
m1 > Ω
X,1
m1 (15)
The fact that price increases relative to marginal cost follows from the markup
policy itself, and costs have to fall, as we have seen above. The third in-
equality follows from the basic Stolper-Samuelson theorem. In fact, the X -
intensive factor will suffer the most, in real income terms, from cartelization
of the X sector. The impact on the other factor will be ambiguous, since its
income may fall relative to P (depending on markup levels), even as it rises
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relative to the other good Y:
Pm1 > 0 > C
1
m1 and Pm1 ≷ Ω
Y,1
m1 > 0 (16)
The imposition of a markup in the X sector implies that the consumer price
of X in terms of Y increases, whereas relative marginal costs fall. With
competitive pricing in factor markets, and with constant returns to scale,
we know from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that there will be a reduction
in the reward of the factor that is intensively used in this sector in terms
of both products, and an increase in the reward of the other factor relative
to both marginal costs. However, since the markup increases the price of X
relative the marginal cost of X, it is not clear that the Y -intensive factor will
actually gain in terms of the sector X price. This factor sees its income rise
vis-a-vis the price of good Y, though it may rise or fall relative to good X.
Consequently, the welfare effect is unclear with regard to this factor owner.
This is directly analogous to the impact of a production tax in a H-O-S
model.9
Consider next the alternative assumption that equation (1) reflects a R-V
transformation technology. Hence, we have a factor specific to each sec-
tor, and a factor that is fully mobile between sectors. Again, we know that
markups are accomplished by constraining output in the X sector. This re-
duced demand for inputs will depress demand for the mobile factor and the
X -specific factor, so that both lose unambiguously as we shift from compe-
tition to a positive markup. Again, there is a direct analogue to the impact
of a production tax in the R-V model. In the Y sector, the Y -specific factor
will experience rising productivity (as the mobile factor moves into the sec-
tor), and rising income in terms of the numeraire Y. However, because the
price of X rises as well, the net effect is ambiguous.10
We can summarize the factor income effects as follows:
9There are empirical issues raised by the factor market effects we have flagged here
that go beyond this paper, but that merit exploration. For example, we should expect
relative factor prices to vary systematically with market structure. In addition, in rigid
wage economies like those in continental Western Europe, we may expect variations along
the employment margin (i.e. unemployment) rather than the wage margin, again as a
function of variations in general degrees of competition.
10We could of course assume that the specific factor captures profits.
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Proposition 6 The benefits from the strategic competition policy are focused
on a specific income group - owners of firms in the imperfectly competitive
sector in the country imposing a markup. The only factors that do not lose
unambiguously from such a policy are those that are relatively specific (in a
H-O-S or R-V sense) to the competitive sector.
Hence, the support for an international agreement which prevents this type
of behavior should stem from all factor owners except possibly for these
latter groups, and the resistance would hinge on the ability of owners to
form a coalition with the factor that is specific or intensively used in the
competitive sector of the economy.11
4 Antitrust with Both Trade and FDI
The results above may seem to provide a compelling economic rationale for
an international antitrust agreement, such as the one currently under nego-
tiation in the WTO. But there are several reasons not to jump to such a
conclusion. First, as a practical matter, little is known about the empirical
magnitude of the problem such an agreement is supposed to solve. But there
are also more basic reasons for scepticism, as we will see. First, the analysis
above assumes the absence of foreign direct investment (FDI). Once FDI is
brought into the picture, the case for an international agreement becomes
much weaker, as long as it is rendered “national treatment”. Second, there
are also unilateral actions that countries can take to mitigate the problem.
In particular, as argued in the ensuing section, extra-territorial application
of national antitrust laws can serve such a role.
11A logical approach beyond the scope of this paper is to introduce a formal political
economy structure and embark on a detailed analytical treatment of political economy
equilibrium competition policies in general equilibrium, starting with the basic winners
and losers identified here. Combined with the political decision process (majority voting,
coalition building, etc.) this will lead to the sustained policy set. Depending on the
power of the beneficiaries of the strategic competition policy, in a politically determined
equilibrium the net importer government may also support a domestic cartel, even though
this is unambiguously bad for overall national welfare. Alternatively, with rent sharing
between inside labour and firm owners, it might be possible to build a coalition of labor
that includes the “losing” factor.
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4.1 Introducing Foreign Direct Investment
While a standard assumption in trade theory (and even more so in industrial
organization) is that firms serve foreign markets through exports without any
local presence, in practice firms often serve foreign markets through local
production. As we will argue, the possibility for firms to undertake FDI
may have significant ramifications for the welfare-enhancing potential of a
competition policy agreement. Indeed, in the policy debate there is parallel
to the discussion concerning the desirability of an international agreement
on competition policy, there is a similar (and politically much more charged)
discussion about an international investment agreement. These issues are
intertwined, circling partly around the question of whether these agreements
are likely to increase or reduce trade, and whether agreements on competition
policy should and/or FDI should be brought into the WTO Agreement.
In order to examine the impact of FDI on the need for an international
agreement on competition policy formally, we return to the model laid out
in Section 2, but now relax our assumption regarding local presence, and
assume that FDI means that firms can produce wherever they find it to be
profitable. Firms in the imperfectly competition industry can thus divide
their production between the two countries in any way they want. Firms
come under the jurisdiction of each country in which they have some pro-
duction. Importantly, the host country is assumed to give identical treatment
to foreign producers in terms of, for instance, access to factors of production
at the same prices as faced by domestic firms (there are thus no special
taxes or input requirement imposed on foreign production), and that it en-
forces the same competition rules with regard to foreign producers for the
production they undertake in the host country, as it applies to domestically
owned firms. There are indeed already some WTO rules in the Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMS) Agreement that require such “national treat-
ment”, even though these rules are incomplete and relatively untested in
WTO jurisprudence. The EU has a relatively recent set of rules following
this principle, while the US, a much older customs union, has a long history
of enforcing such rules internally under the Interstate Commerce clause of
the US Constitution. In addition to TRIMS, in a WTO context we also have
rules on imports and the WTO agreement on services (the GATS or General
Agreement on Trade in Services) as further examples on non-discrimination
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provisions of international (and interstate) commercial rules.
It is instructive to conduct a thought experiment introducing the opportu-
nity for FDI in the trade-only type of equilibrium we examined before, and
summarized in Figure 2. In this equilibrium, firms located in Country 1
have a competitive advantage following from lax competition enforcement.
Country 2 firms will hence find it profitable to shift production to Country
1, provided that they receive national treatment there. Assuming that the
investing firms repatriate their earnings, this will shift profits to Country 2.
At the same time, the optimal markup for Country 1 among its firms clearly
falls because profit, including profit gained at the expense of domestic con-
sumers, is now partially captured by foreigners. In terms of equation (11),
the terms-of-trade gain that followed from the partial monopolization is re-
duced. Country 2, on the other hand, will not find any reason to change its
policy of marginal cost pricing. It takes advantage of the lower production
costs in Country 1, induced by the partial monopolization of the industry,
and it tends to gain both on account of the profit shifting, as well as the
improved terms-of-trade.
How far will this reallocation process go if left unchecked? Country 2 firms
will have incentive to shift production to Country 1 as long as there is any
difference in production costs between the two economies, or until all pro-
duction of X occurs in Country 1. This reallocation will continue either
until all production of X occurs in Country 1, or until Country 1 ceases to
allow/enforce prices above marginal costs. In the latter case, the production
equilibrium would be exactly the same as in the case of a globally welfare
maximizing competition policy agreement.
Formally, note that in the presence of foreign production, the welfare of
Country 1 is
V 1(m1,m2) =
1
I(P )
[
(P − C1)X1 + C1(X1 + Z) + T 1(X1 + Z)] (17)
where X1 now refers to production of product X by Country 1 firms, and
Z(m1,m2) is production of X by Country 2 firms in Country 1. At what
level of foreign production will Country 1 enforce marginal cost pricing in
the Nash equilibrium? Differentiating with respect to m1 and evaluating at
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m1 = m2 = 0:
V 11 (0, 0) =
X1 −D1
I(P )
Pm1 +
Z
I(P )
Cm1 (18)
The first term is positive as before. The second term is negative. Country 2
firms will hence shift production to Country 1 until their joint production is
such as to make the right-hand side of this expression equal to zero. When
this holds, there are no incentives for foreign producers to either increase or
reduce their production in Country 1.
The pro-competitive effect of FDI identified here contrasts with that normally
portrayed in the trade and the industrial organization literature. It is not
the increased competition in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium due to an increase
in the number of firms, nor is it the undercutting by external firms of the
cartel price. Instead, FDI reduces the optimal degree of concentration for
Country 1 for two reasons: first, it enables foreign firms to take a share of the
surplus initially created through concentration for the domestic country; and
second, the FDI increases marginal costs in the domestic industry, reducing
competitive advantage. Hence, at the margin, we have less surplus created
by a given markup. Basically, FDI acts to arbitrage away cost advantages
created by the beggar-thy-neighbor competition policy.12
The findings can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 7 Inward FDI may induce Country 1 to enforce marginal cost
pricing, as long as it provides national treatment to foreign production, thus
removing the global efficiency gains from an international agreement on com-
petition policy.13
One reason why the policy discussion on the Multilateral Agreement on In-
vestment proposed by the OECD has been so charged is that this agreement
has been seen as providing national treatment protection (or even stronger
12We should note that if we were to introduce unions or rigid wages in our general
equilibrium setup, factor costs may not adjust fully and the incentive for FDI may therefore
be reduced.
13A tax on the earnings of foreign-owned plants could be used to limit this mechanism.
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protection) to investing firms, without imposing any constraints on their be-
havior. Hence, some have suggested that an international investment agree-
ment must be complemented with an agreement on competition policy. The
analysis above offers a rather different perspective. Proposition 7 suggests
that (within our model) an agreement on national treatment may weaken
the incentives for countries to pursue a beggar-thy-neighbor antitrust policy.
Actually, the marginal cost pricing equilibrium achieved through FDI is ex-
actly the same as the equilibrium that would arise if marginal cost pricing
were enforced through an international agreement. To see this, note that
the marginal cost pricing Nash equilibrium with FDI is characterized by the
following expressions:
p = −T jx(xj) j = 1, 2 (19)
S(p)
[
p(x1 + x2) + c1z + T 1(x1 + z) + T 2(x2)
]
= p(x1 + z + x2) (20)
(x1 − d1)EPPm1 + zc1m1 = 0 (21)
D1 = S(p)
[
px1 + c1z + T 1(x1 + z)
]
(22)
where p = c1. Equation (19) defines marginal cost pricing, equation (20) is
our market clearing condition, equation (21) follows from equation (18) and
relates the profit-shifting effect against terms-of-trade gains, while equation
(22) defines home demand. Equations (19) and (20) define a sub-system
that yield equilibrium prices and output P and Xj. With identical demands,
these are identical to those in the competitive equilibrium with trade only.
This finding can be illustrated graphically by again using Figure 1, assuming
that we have started from the equilibrium in Figure 2. This new equilibrium
imposes the conditions in equations (19) through (22). Given equations (19)
and (20), FDI moves trade to the same level as under a competitive trade-
only equilibrium (identical to the case originally illustrated in the figure).
Hence, we have a tangency in the figure with both production possibility
frontiers, and a trade vector identical to a competitive non-FDI trade vector.
The only difference is that in the case of FDI, in Country 2 firm production
is now split into the domestic production X1 and the foreign production Z.
However, since there is marginal cost pricing, there are no profits in this
sector, and the ownership of firms in the sector is immaterial outside any
transition process.
Country 1 loses from the FDI, since it suffers both a terms of trade loss
and a loss of income through shifting of profits to Country 2 (assuming that
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firms repatriate their profits), and Country 2 correspondingly gains. The
reason why there are unambiguous losses to Country 1 is that the investing
firms do not bring with them either technology, or any productive resources.
Consequently, Country 1 has an incentive to deny firms from Country 2
equal access to domestic resources, or to remove their incentives to invest by
enforcing marginal cost pricing.14
Proposition 8 In the absence of side payments, Country 1 will oppose both
an international agreement on antitrust, as well as an international agree-
ment on investment that would enforce national treatment of FDI.
4.2 Extra-Territorial Application of National Compe-
tition Policy
Clearly, one reason why the country with net exports of product X man-
ages to pursue a strategic competition policy is the fact that the import-
ing country has no jurisdiction over the exporting firms, by our assumption
about extra-territoriality. Hence, an obvious solution from the point of view
of the importing country would be to apply its competition policy extra-
territorially. This is exactly the strategy followed in recent years by the
European Commission vis-a-vis foreign mergers. Exporting firms in Country
1 would then come under two jurisdictions, and it would here seem rea-
sonable to assume that the more stringent of the two applied. Therefore,
Country 2 would enforce marginal cost pricing both at home and abroad,
and the extra-territorial application of Country 2’s competition policy would
thus lead to a globally efficient outcome. This could also be accomplished
by requiring marginal cost pricing. Ironically, anti-dumping laws encourage
the behavior that extra-territorial competition policy would oppose. These
laws effectively encourage price discrimination when it leads to higher prices
in export markets. In this sense, they are anti-competitive.15
14Note that firm interaction/collusion in product markets may mean they are also able
to erect entry barriers against FDI. See for example Campa et al (1998).
15See Head and Ries (1997) for a discussion of extraterritoriality. Note that while in
the present model, the government of Country 2 faces the correct incentives from a global
welfare viewpoint, this may conceal some drawbacks associated with extra-territoriality.
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Proposition 9 A system of extra-territorial application of national competi-
tion policies would substitute for an international agreement on these policies.
5 Summary
The purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate the need to broaden the
perspective in competition policy analysis. The currently prevailing approach
in industrial organization theory, of implicitly restricting the analysis to the
study of a discretionary intervention in a small distorted sector in an other-
wise perfectly competitive economy that is closed to the rest of the world,
is too limited for the analysis of many current policy issues. To highlight
the difference an open economy, general equilibrium approach may make, we
have pointed to certain basic aspects of antitrust in a very simple two-country,
two-sector trade model in which countries can choose a general competitive
stance. This has allowed us to highlight the role of relative opportunity cost,
through the economy-wide interactions between goods and factor markets,
for the design of national competition policies in a trade context.
The general equilibrium approach yields a significantly different perspective
on antitrust than does the standard IO framework:
1. It is the difference in the degree to which different sectors diverge from
perfect competition that matters. The markup in a particular sector is
hence not a valid predictor of misallocation of resources.
2. The rents created through imperfect competition will partly end up
with factor owners through the interaction of factor and product mar-
kets. This “rent dissipation” does not require factor owners to be
In the present model, “maximal competition” is globally desirable. However, if we relax
the assumptions of the present model, then a system of over-lapping jurisdictions may
tend to lead toward too much competition, from a world welfare viewpoint. For example,
in the presence of economies of scale, the issue may look different. In such a case it might
be desirable to allow for some exploitation of market power, the private benefits of which
may be unevenly distributed internationally, in order to enable exploitation of returns to
scale.
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cartelized, as often maintained in the IO literature. As a consequence,
indices of competition that rely on costs, such as Lerner indices, exag-
gerate the absolute price reduction that enforcement of perfect compe-
tition would entail. As competition is increased, not only will the price
tend to fall, but marginal cost will also tend to increase.
3. The consumer-producer dichotomy may be misleading. What matters
to consumers is their real income. Exactly how different consumers
are affected depends on the underlying production structure. Certain
consumers may lose from lack of competition both because they face
higher prices, and because their incomes fall. Other consumers may
benefit enough on the latter account to gain overall.
With regard to the more specific issue of the scope for an international agree-
ment to curb beggar-thy-neighbor competition policies, we have observed:
4. Countries that are net exporters in the sectors that are more easily
cartelized have incentives to pursue beggar-thy-neighbor competition
policies.
5. There is a certain political logic to the fact that there are attempts
to bring such a competition policy agreement into a structure like the
WTO. This is, in part, because such an agreement would enhance trade.
This is also because a competition policy agreement may require side
payments, and a trade agreement, like the WTO or regional schemes,
offers plenty of scope for members to trade off gains under one agree-
ment with losses under another agreement. There is reason to believe
that support for such an agreement could come from a wide spectrum
of factor owners in both exporting and importing countries.
The discussion has also suggested that the gains from an international com-
petition policy agreement may be limited due to certain other legal regimes:
6. If FDI is permitted and is provided national treatment, investment
can be expected to respond to the competitive advantages created by
national competition policies, and to undermine the scope for a com-
petition policy agreement.
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7. Extraterritorial application of competition laws may effectively prevent
countries from pursuing beggar-thy-neighbor policies.
Finally, much of the development in trade policy analysis during the last 25
years has come from the importation of tools and insights from the industrial
organization literature. We hope that this paper contributes to convincing
industrial organization researcher economists that it is time to make the
exchange of ideas more balanced.
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7 Annex: derivation of equation (11)
This annex explains the derivation of equation (11), which is the basis for
subsequent welfare analytics within the paper. The welfare expression (9)
W j(m1,m2) =
1
I(P )
[
(P − Cj)Xj + CjXj + T j(Xj)]
can be simplified as follows:
W j(m1,m2) =
1
I(P )
[
(P )Xj + T j(Xj)
]
The derivatives with respect to the markup mj are
W j
mj
(m1,m2) = A+B
where
A =
[
PXj
mj
+ TXjX
j
mj
+ PmjX
j
]
I(P )
and
B = −IPPmj [PX
j + T j]
I(P )2
Using equation (4) we can rewrite A, as
A =
[
mjXj
mj
+ PmjX
j
]
I(P )
And by Shepard’s Lemma we can express demand D on its dual form
D = IPW
j = IP
[
PXj + T j
]
implying that
B = −DPmj
I(P )
Combining these expression, we have equation (11):
W j
mj
=
mjXj
I(P )
+
Xj −Dj
I(P )
Pmj
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